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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

Plaintiff/Appellant Jeff Mannor (hereinafter "Jeff') appeals the District Court's award of
$8,144.98 in attorney's fees and costs after the dismissal of Jeffs Complaint for Partition of

Real Estate and Sale (hereinafter "Complaint") on summary judgment. Jeff is not appealing the
District Court's dismissal of the Complaint. Jeff is challenging the District Court's award of
attorney fees of $5,700, as well as a subsequent supplemental award of fees and costs of
$2,444.98, pursuant to an attorney fee clause in the parties' stipulated Judgment and Decree of
Divorce (hereinafter "Decree").

B.

Statement of Facts

The genesis of this dispute lies in an award of real property to Defendant/Respondent
Patricia Marmor (hereinafter "Patricia") in the Decree entered in 2009. The Decree awarded
Patricia, as her sole and separate property, the community residence on 304 E. Scopes Owl Drive
in Kuna, Idaho (hereinafter the "Property"). (R. at 56). Paragraph 15 of the Decree states:

15.
Transfers to Wife. Husband shall, and by Stipulation he has transferred,
assigned and conveyed to Wife as her sole and separate property, and forever
waives any and all rights in and to, the items more particularly described as
follows:
15.01. Wife shall be awarded the marital property located at 304 E. Scopes Owl
Dr., Kuna, Idaho. Wife shall make a good faith effort to refinance the property
within 180 days of the date of entry of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce in this
matter at a comparable interest rate and/or payment amount. Wife will be
responsible for all mortgage payments associated with this property. Husband's
name shall remain on title until the refinance is complete. In the event Wife
defaults on any mortgage payment she agrees she will cure the default within thirty
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(30) days or vacate premises. If the default is not cured the house will be placed on
the market for sale by Husband and Wife. The parties shall co-operate fully in
listing, showing, and signing any and all documents required to sell the property
for any offer received at the then fair market value as determined by an
independent appraiser. Wife will receive the entire proceeds from the sale minus
costs and fees and maintenance fees paid by husband minus any rents received by
husband prior to sale.
(R. at 56). As stated in Paragraph 15, because the parties were both obligated on the mortgage,
Patricia agreed to make a good faith effort to refinance the property in order to remove Jeff from
the mortgage obligation. (R. at 56). Over the next several years, Patricia was unable to complete
a refinance. (R. at 84). This action followed.

C.

Course of Proceedings

On November 28, 2012, Jeff filed his Complaint in District Court. (R. at 5-44). Count
One of the Complaint sought a declaratory judgment that Jeff and Patricia each had a joint tenant
interest in the Property. (R. at 10). Count Two sought an order that the Property be immediately
refinanced or that it be sold. (R. at 11). While Jeff alleged in Paragraph 11 of the Complaint that
he was a ''joint tenant with an undivided 50% interest in the real property," (R. at 7), he did not
disclose anywhere in the Complaint that Patricia received the property as her sole and separate
property in the Decree. (R. at 56).
Patricia moved for summary judgment. (R. at 45). Patricia argued that under Idaho law
the clear and unambiguous language of the Decree awarded her the Property as her sole and
separate property. (R. at 76-78). Therefore, a partition action, which can only be brought under
LC. § 6-501 when cotenants hold property as "parceners, joint tenants or tenants in common,"
failed as a matter of law and should be dismissed. (Id.). Patricia further contended that under
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Idaho law the property division in the Decree was final and res judicata, and that the District
Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to modify its provisions. (R. at 78-79).
Jeff filed two affidavits (but no brief) in response to Patricia's Motion, which affidavits
dealt exclusively with the dispute between Patricia and Jeff over the refinancing of the Property.
(R. at 83-104). At the hearing, Jeff contended he remained a co-owner of the real property. (Tr.
Feb. 11, 2013, at p. 15, LL 1-13). He contended the Decree conditioned Patricia's separate
ownership on her successfully refinancing the property because the Decree stated his name
remained on title. (Id. at pp. 16-17, 24). Jeff argued the Decree evidenced an intent that Jeff
would remain a co-owner and could file a partition action in the event the refinancing was not
completed. (Id. at p. 19). Jeff's counsel acknowledged at the hearing on summary judgment that
all Jeff sought was to be released from any liability on the mortgage, which could be achieved
via a refinance or a sale. (Id. at pp. 24-25).
The District Court summarily dismissed the action from the bench, ruling that "if the
plaintiff in this case believes that the defendant has not fulfilled her obligation under the divorce
decree, the remedy lies there in the magistrate's division." (Id. at p. 33). Judgment was entered
on March 8, 2013. (R. at 113).
Within fourteen days of entry of final judgment, Patricia filed a Memorandum of Costs
and requested her attorney fees. (R. at 115-121). Her basis was Paragraph 31 of the stipulated
Divorce Decree, which states:
Each party shall bear their own attorneys fees and costs for this action, provided
however, that in any proceeding brought or defended in the future by either party
to enforce the terms of this stipulation, in any court, including state, or federal
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bankruptcy court, the substantially prevailing party in that proceeding shall be
entitled to recover their costs, including attorneys fees.
(R. at 60).

Jeff filed an objection and argued that the action was just filed to "enforce property
rights," not the terms of the stipulated Decree. (R. at 128-129). Jeff claimed that because the
action was brought in district court it "could not possibly involve the enforcement of the decree,
because enforcement of the decree is not within the district court's jurisdiction." (R. at 128).
The Court disagreed and awarded fees pursuant to the attorney fee clause in the Decree,
focusing on the broad language mandating such an award "in any proceeding . . . to enforce the
terms" of the stipulated Decree. (Tr. Apr. 22, 2013, at p. 11, LL 11-15). A Judgment and Order
for Costs and Fees was entered on April 25, 2013. (R. at 140-141).
Then, without filing a notice of appeal or posting a supersedeas bond, Jeff filed a motion
to stay execution of the judgment. (AR. at Exh. A). Patricia objected. (AR. at Exh. E). After a
hearing, the Court denied the motion, ruling from the bench that there was "no good cause for
departing from th[ e] traditional procedure" that a stay is issued upon the posting of adequate
security. (Tr. May, 23, 2013, at p. 9, LL 2-5).
After the notice of appeal was filed and the bond posted, Patricia filed a supplemental
memorandum of fees and costs on June 6, 2013. (AR. at Exh. K). Patricia requested fees incurred
in litigating Jeff's objection to her memorandum of costs. (Id.). Patricia also requested fees
incurred responding to Jeff's attempt to stay execution of a money judgment without posting
security. (Id.) Again Jeff objected, arguing that the fees were "outrageously high" and that part of
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the request was untimely. (AR. at Exh. L). Jeff contended Cosho Humphrey, LLP either
intentionally "inflated" their fees to achieve a "windfall" for Patricia or was doing its client a
"drastic disservice by charging such extraordinary fees." (Id.) Jeff also contended the fees
incurred in litigating the award of attorney's fees should be disallowed because the supplemental
memorandum sought fee incurred in litigating the fee award, but was not filed within fourteen
days of the April 25, 2013 Judgment ofAttorney Fees and Costs. (Id.).
The Judge overruled Jeff's objection and awarded all the fees requested, in a
Memorandum Decision and Order. (AR. at Exh. 0). The District Court found that the
supplemental memorandum was timely filed, citing case law approving an award of fees incurred
in litigating a fee request, reasoning that "the prevailing party may supplement its attorney fee
memorandum to include the costs incurred in securing its fee, and that a supplemental
memorandum relates back to the date the original memorandum of costs was filed." (Id.) Jeff
then filed an amended notice of appeal challenging the District Court's ruling on the timeliness
of the supplemental memorandum but not the Court's ruling on the reasonableness of the fees.
II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL

A. Patricia should be awarded her attorney fees and costs on appeal

Patricia should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against
this appeal, pursuant to Paragraph 31 of the Decree. The parties agreed that "in any proceeding
brought or defended in the future by either party to enforce the terms of this stipulation, in any
court . . . the substantially prevailing party in that proceeding shall be entitled to recover their
costs, including attorneys fees." (R. at 60). Jeff's appeal fails to demonstrate any error in the
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District Court's interpretation of the plain language of the attorney fee provision in the Decree,
or the District Court's decision that the supplemental memorandum was timely filed. Therefore,
Patricia should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

III.

ARGUMENT

This is a simple case involving the interpretation of an attorney fee clause in the parties'
stipulated Decree. The District Court properly interpreted the relevant provision and correctly
awarded fees because the facts are clear that Jeff filed an action to enforce the Decree and lost.
Jeff does not challenge the fact that Patricia was the prevailing party. He does not challenge the
District Court's ruling that the fees were reasonable. Rather, Jeff argues that his partition action
was not about enforcing the Decree and so fees cannot be awarded under the attorney fee
provision of the Decree. Jeff's argument contradicts the plain language of the attorney fee clause,
is contrary to the relief requested in his own pleadings, and is contradicted by his counsel's
admissions in open court. The District Court correctly interpreted the attorney fee clause of the
Decree. Likewise, the District Court correctly related the supplemental memorandum of costs
back to the date of the filing of the original memorandum of costs. The District Court's
judgments awarding attorney's fees and costs should be affirmed.
A. The District Court correctly interpreted the attorney fee clause of the Decree in
awarding Patricia her attorney's fees

In awarding fees, the District Court relied on the following term in the parties' stipulated
Decree.
Each party shall bear their own attorneys fees and costs for this action, provided
however, that in any proceeding brought or defended in the future by either party
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to enforce the terms of this stipulation, in any court, including state, or federal
bankruptcy court, the substantially prevailing party in that proceeding shall be
entitled to recover their costs, including attorneys fees.
(R. at 60).
lbis Court has held that the ordinary rules of contract interpretation apply to the
interpretation of divorce decrees. Toyama v. Toyama, 129 Idaho 142, 144, 922 P.2d 1068, 1070
(1996) (citing Delancey v. Delancey, 110 Idaho 63, 65, 714 P.2d 32, 34 (1986)). The Court
stated in Page v. Pasquali,
Construction of the meaning of a contract begins with the language of the contract.
If the contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the determination of the
contract's meaning and legal effect are questions of law and the meaning of the
contract and intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of the
contract's own words.
150 Idaho 150, 152, 244 P.3d 1236, 1238 (2010) (quoting Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms,
138 Idaho 774, 779, 69 P.3d 1035, 1040 (2003)).
At issue here is the term in the Decree stating that "in any proceeding brought or
defended in the future by either party to enforce the terms of this stipulation," the prevailing
party would be entitled to attorney fees and costs. Although Jeff now stretches at every chance to
re-characterize the case he filed, the facts are that Jeff filed this action to enforce the terms of the
parties' Decree. Any fair reading of his Complaint shows the crux of the matter was Patricia's
alleged non-compliance with at term of the stipulated Decree, the refinancing requirement in
Paragraph 15. Jeffs counsel admitted oral argument on Patricia's Motion for Summary
Judgment that the case was filed to force Patricia to refinance the loan and that ultimately that
was all Jeff wanted. (Tr. Feb. 11, 2013, at p. 24, LL 15-25, p. 25, LL 1-14 ). In dismissing the
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action, the District Court found that Jeff should have the magistrate court adjudicate Patricia's
alleged non-compliance with her obligation to refinance the loan. (Id. at p. 33). Jeff's position
now that the action had nothing to do with the Decree, but was instead just an attempt to enforce
property rights by seeking a partition of the property, cannot be sustained by the basic facts of
the case. Jeff's argument ignores the very purpose and thrust of the case he filed.
First, as set forth below, Jeff's entire Complaint revolved around this refinancing
requirement. For example, Jeff alleged the following:
16. Plaintiff and Defendant Marmor divorced on or about May 2009 wherein
Defendant Marmor was ordered, pursuant to the Stipulated Property Settlement
Agreement, to refinance the Property within 180 days of the Decree of Divorce.
17. Despite Plaintiff's repeated requests Defendant Marmor has failed to take any
steps to refinance or sell the Property.
(R. at 8).
Notably, in Count Two "Partition of Real Property," Jeff gave four reasons for seeking a
sale instead of a partition in kind. Reasons (2) through (4) were:
(2) Defendant Marmor has been either unwilling or unable to refinance the
property as stipulated to in a 2009 Property Settlement Agreement between the
parties, (3) so long as Plaintiff remains obligated on the debt service associated
with the Property Plaintiff does not have the financial resources necessary support
an additional mortgage and is thus precluded from property ownership, (4)
Defendant Marmor has been unwilling to refinance or cooperate with the listing
and sale of the Property

(R. at 9).
Most importantly, in Jeff's Prayer for Relief he asks as to "Count Two-Partition of Real
Property" for:
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4. An order and judgment that the real property be immediately refinanced,
removing the Plaintiff from any and all debt service obligations, or that the real
property by {sicJ sold and that the proceeds of the sale and any other
encumbrances be paid, together with the costs and expenses of this action and the
sale of the Property, and the remainder then be divided between the Plaintiff and
Defendant in accordance with their respective interests and rights under the

Property Settlement Agreement.
(R. at 11) (emphasis added).
After making these allegations, and after expressly asking District Court to order Patricia
to immediately refinance the property, Jeff made the perplexing argument to the District Court
that this case "could not possibly involve the enforcement of the decree." (R. at 128). What's
more, Jeff continues his mischaracterization of the case in this Court. He claims that he only
asked the Court to order Patricia to refinance as an alternative. Jeff states "Although Mr. Marmor
did request a refinance, this request was done as an accommodation in the alternative of a full
partition sale that he was entitled to under law." (Appellant's Br. at 5). Jeff claims "[n]owhere in
the pleadings did Mr. Marmor request any relief pursuant to the terms of the divorce decree ...

." (Id.). These statements directly contradict the precise relief sought in the Complaint and ignore
that the sale of the property was actually in the nature of alternative relief. Jeff asked for an order
that the "real property be immediately refinanced, removing Plaintiff from any and all debt
service obligations, or that the real property by [sic] sold .... " (emphasis added) (R. at 11).
Jeff's argument on appeal is exactly opposite of how he framed his Complaint. There is
no question Jeff was seeking to enforce the Decree. The term "enforce" means "to give force or
effect to" or "to compel obedience to." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). The refinancing
requirement was a creature of the Decree. Jeff sought to give effect to it and compel Patricia's
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obedience to her obligations under the Decree. When Jeff formed a belief that this requirement
was not being met, he chose a partition action as a vehicle to enforce that requirement-holding
the possibility of a forced sale of the property as a stick to achieve his goal. Jeff cannot now take
the position that he was just seeking to enforce some amorphous property rights, that he just
"requested declaratory relief to clarify his rights to the property." (Appellant's Br. at 5). The
entire thrust of this dispute and his lawsuit turned on the refinancing requirement in the Decree.
Further, Jeff's counsel admitted this case was filed to prompt Patricia to refinance the
Decree and that this was ultimately all Jeff sought. At oral argument on Patricia's Motion for
Summary Judgment, the following colloquy took place:
THE COURT: Well, ultimately the relief that - or the claim that is being made is
that the defendant has failed to fulfill her legal obligation in making a good faith
attempt to refinance or otherwise get your client's name off the debt instruments,
essentially, and so that he is no longer in any way, shape, or form liable on the
mortgages on this place.
That's ultimately all he wants. Right?
MR. FOGG: Correct
THE COURT: And having failed to persuade or otherwise force or persuade his
ex-wife to get on the ball and refinance this place or sell it or whatever, just pay
off these two notes with his name on them, he just wants an order ultimately from
me finding that this house has to be sold and all the proceeds can go to her as soon
as the lienholders are paid off.
MR. FOGG: Disposed of. Whether that is a refinance in her name or a sale
doesn't matter. And to continue maybe, I think the question is coming, because of
her failure to fulfill her obligations, it's not her sole and separate. Because it's not
her sole and separate, he has a right to partition.
(Tr. Feb. 11, 2013, at p. 24, LL 15-25; p. 25, LL 1-14).
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These comments by Jeff's counsel directly contradict his current argument that he never
sought to enforce any term of the decree. These comments, made at oral argument on summary
judgment, are an admission that this case was about enforcing the Decree.
Second, Jeff's argument that the parties actually contemplated a partition action in the
event refinancing was not obtained does not change the basic purpose of his case. Jeff argues at
length that a forced sale clause was purposefully left out of the Decree because the parties
contemplated a partition action in the event Patricia failed to obtain a refinance. This argument is
an attempt to somehow divorce Jeff's partition action from the Decree in order to shield his case
from the attorney fee clause. Jeff constructs a theory that the parties purposefully chose to leave
out a sale order because Jeff could always just file a partition action, emphasizing the sentence
"Husband's name shall remain on title until the refinance is complete." (R. at 56).
Never mind that the Decree contains an integration clause stating it was the "entire
understanding of the parties." (R. at 91). Or that the property was transferred to Patricia as her
sole and separate property in the Decree, with not a mention anywhere of Jeff continuing to hold
an interest as co-tenant. (R. at 56). Or that under Idaho law "[i]n the absence of an appeal from
an original decree of divorce, the property division portions of that decree are final, res judicata,
and no jurisdiction exists to modify property provisions of a divorce decree." McBride v.

McBride, 112 Idaho 959, 961, 739 P.2d 258, 260 (1987) (citing Sullivan v. Sullivan, 102 Idaho
737, 639 P.2d 435 (1981)). What's more, his partition action was dismissed and Jeff never
appealed that dismissal. Thus, he argues at length that action was valid because he was a coowner, yet never appealed the District Court's dismissal of the Complaint.
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But even assuming Jeff is correct that the parties contemplated a partition action and that
such an action could be filed, it still remains true that Jeff would be seeking to enforce the
Decree and his rights thereunder. While his interpretation of the Decree is questionable, it is
ultimately irrelevant to the ultimate finding that Patricia is entitled to her attorney's fees under
Paragraph 31. Whether Jeff chose a partition action or a contempt action, or any other action, he
would still be seeking to enforce Patricia's obligations, and his rights, under the Decree. At heart,
his argument that a partition action was contemplated by the parties but yet was not a term of the
decree is a tortured analysis with one goal: avoiding the attorney fee clause in the Decree.
Third, Jeff's argument that he could not have brought suit in district court seeking to
enforce the decree because that issue is properly brought before the "family court" is flawed. The
attorney fee provision is broad and covers "any proceeding." (R. at 60). It does not carve out
disputes arising out the Decree that a party seeks to resolve in the wrong court. That is essentially
what happened here. Jeff's contention that because the District Court has no jurisdiction to
enforce a divorce decree, he could not possibly have been trying to enforce the Decree, ignores
one other possibility: an action filed in the wrong court. Simply because Jeff labeled his action a
"Complaint for Partition" and filed it in district court does not change the substance of what he
sought. The parties' rights and remedies vis-a-vis the former community property are found in
the Decree. By seeking to adjudicate those rights, Jeff sought enforcement of the Decree. The
Court ruled that his remedy should be pursued in the magistrate court. The fact that Jeff chose
the wrong court should not be held against Patricia.
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In sum, the broad attorney fee clause in the Decree unambiguously covers this action. Jeff
filed a partition action to force Patricia to refmance the loan on the Property awarded to Patricia
in the Decree. Her obligation to refmance was a term of the Decree. As made clear in his
affidavits and argument in District Court, Jeff believed Patricia was not complying with her
obligations under the Decree and chose a partition action to force her hand. When he lost, Jeff
shifted gears to avoid an attorney fee award and argued the action was just a simple action to
enforce "property rights." Jeff's argument that he was not seeking to enforce a term of Decree
cannot be sustained.

B. The District Court correctly ruled Patricia's supplemental memorandum of
costs was timely filed
Patricia's Supplemental Memorandum was timely. The parties agreed that attorney fees
and costs incurred in "any proceeding" would be borne by the non-prevailing party. (R. at 60).
That broad language encompasses costs and fees incurred on post-judgment motions, especially
when one of the motions filed was an unnecessary motion to stay collection of a money
judgment during a pending appeal, filed and heard before Jeff had posted the required security.
Patricia's supplemental request for fees sought to an award of fees incurred in litigating Jeffs
objection to the first memorandum of costs as well as fees incurred responding to Jeffs
unsuccessful motion to stay execution of the judgment. Jeff's objection in District Court was
limited to the award of fees incurred in litigating the fee award because the supplemental
memorandum was filed within the fourteen days of the order denying Jeffs Motion to Stay
Execution.
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Jeff's argument, unsupported by any case law, fails to consider that supplemental cost
bills are specifically allowed under this Court's precedent. See Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho
746, 185 P.3d 258 (2008). In Lettunich, the non-prevailing party challenged the district court's
award of attorney fees for litigating the amount of the fee award. Id at 752, 185 P.3d at 264.
The contract at issue, a settlement agreement between the parties, provided for an award of
attorney fees to the prevailing party in any action to enforce the terms of the agreement. Id The
Court held that where the prevailing party has a legal right to recover attorney fees in the action,
"litigation over the amount of the attorney fee award is also part of the legal action for which he
is entitled to an award of attorney fees." Id Even more importantly, the Court characterized the
continuation of the litigation over attorney fees as "part of the legal action to enforce the terms of
the agreement." Id.
As the District Court correctly held, Jeff's position that Patricia's supplemental
memorandum was untimely cannot be reconciled with this Court's ruling in Lettunich. Rule
54(d)(5) states:
At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any party who
claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a memorandum of costs,
itemizing each claimed expense, but such memorandum of costs may not be filed
later than fourteen (14) days after entry of judgment. Such memorandum must
state that to the best of the party's knowledge and belief the items are correct
and that the costs claimed are in compliance with this rule. Failure to file such
memorandum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall be a waiver of
the right of costs. A memorandum of costs prematurely filed shall be considered as
timely.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(5).
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Thus, a party seeking fees and costs is required to file a memorandum of costs and fees
within fourteen days of entry of judgment. Any supplemental request for fees ought to relate
back to the date of that filing. Under Jeff's theory, any fees incurred by a prevailing party in a
post-judgment proceeding that resulted in an order-not a judgment-would not be compensable
as the Rule refers to entry of judgment. A "judgment" means a "separate document entitled
Judgment or Decree." Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(a). "A judgment shall state the relief to which a party
is entitled on one or more claims for relief in the action. Such relief can include dismissal with or
without prejudice." Id "A 'judgment' is '[a] court's final determination of the rights and
obligations of the parties in a case." Neighbors For Responsible Growth v. Kootenai County, 147
Idaho 173, 178, 207 P.3d 149, 154 (2009). A judgment is "the law's last word in a judicial
controversy." 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 1 (2006). Considering there are a number of postjudgment motions that can be filed and litigated, the District Court correctly related the
supplemental filing back to the date the original memorandum of costs and fees was filedhence, the use of the term "supplemental." Otherwise, fees incurred litigating any number many
post judgment motions would never be compensable because the fees would almost always be
incurred more than fourteen days after entry of the final judgment.
In sum, Rule 54 contemplates an initial filing within fourteen days of the entry of final
judgment. Post-judgment litigation is also compensable under the case law. In this case, Jeff
agreed to be responsible for the costs incurred by Patricia in any proceeding to enforce the terms
of the Decree if he did not prevail. This agreement was not limited in any way and plainly covers
all fees and costs, not just those incurred up to the entry ofjudgment.
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IV.

JEFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES

Jeff requests attorney's fees pursuant to Paragraph 31 of the Decree and I.C. § 12-121. In
other words, Jeff argues his appeal of the District Court's decision that the partition action was a
proceeding to enforce the Decree is itself a proceeding to enforce the Decree. This "heads I win,
tails you lose" argument is misplaced. And since Jeff has not demonstrated any error on the part
of the District Court requiring reversal he is not entitled to attorney's fees under the Decree.
Finally, Jeff's request for fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 lacks merit. This statute
authorizes the Court to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal, not as a
matter of right, but only where the Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously or without foundation. Thompson v. Pike, 125 Idaho
897, 876 P.2d 595 (1994). Despite the fact that Patricia prevailed on every single motion filed in
District Court, and successfully obtained a dismissal of the Complaint on summary judgment,
Jeff claims her "use of the divorce decree [to seek fees] lacks merit and foundation."
(Appellant's Br. at 9). Thus, despite being the respondent on this appeal and the prevailing party
on every issue below-including the dismissal of the Complaint, a decision that Jeff did not even
choose to appeal-Jeff contends Patricia's defense of this appeal is frivolous and without
foundation. The Court should reject this argument.

V.

CONCLUSION

The District Court's Judgments awarding attorney's fees and costs should be affirmed.
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